Comments on "Equal
opportunity" by Laura Laubeova
By
Tomáš Cvrček
Apart
From "freedom", equality is perhaps the most overused term in today's
political debate. This fact is just another testimony of the lasting legacy of
the French Revolution which coined the modem democratic Holy Trinity of
"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity". Of course, the French revolutionaries
needed a catch‑phrase, so it was only logical for them to sum up their
political agenda in just three words. The pitfall: the catch‑phrase soon
became a catch‑all for politicians of all strands and colours, meaning all
sorts of things to all sorts of people. But the problem is, that for a great
part of the French revolutionaries, the three words had very clear meaning
‑ at least in the area of practical politics (if not in the field of
political philosophy).
If
discovering a true meaning of a word requires an investigation of its original
usage, we must ask the equality of what was on the French Revolution's agenda.
Then, equality meant the abolition of taxing exemptions, of separate
jurisdiction for clergy and aristocracy, of royal prerogatives and so on. In
other words, using Laubeova's fourfold distinction, they had in mind the formal
equality, i.e. an equality under law.
The
remaining interpretations of equality (i.e. e. of opportunity, of condition and
of outcome) are all later political addition and appeared in practical politics
(e.g. as part of some party agenda usually left‑wing) later. Serious
attempts were made to achieve each of the three. But all such attempts failed to
this date. The only equality where success has been attained is equality before
law.
And
for a good reason: for the remaining three kinds of equality are all problematic.
To start with equality of outcome, the article itself stresses that it would
entail considerable infringements on personal liberty. Admittedly, there have
existed communities where this strictest notion of liberty was and is adhered to
but their community life usually involves tight control and would be hardly
applicable to larger communities, let alone whole societies. It is also morally
indefensible since it may award the same outcome to criminals as well as to
benefactors.
The
idea of equality of condition is also problematic. It involves the idea of
levelling the playing field. In other words, inequality is present if
disadvantaged groups, in spite of having a nominal access to institutions and
social positions, are prevented from actually rising from their disadvantaged,
disqualifying position due to their current circumstances. It is doubtful
whether equality of condition is attainable either. How can anyone 1evel the
playing field" for, say, a small person wishing to play in the NBA? Surely,
bodily height would qualify as a "circumstance of life"? Of course,
the "access to institutions and social positions" is there: the NBA
does not discriminate on the basis of race, colour of skin, religion or any
other characteristic which may be used for discrimination ‑ except height.
They use a group characteristic and they exclude a whole group of people ‑
not openly (as in putting it in their mission statement) but tacitly. Yet,
rarely anyone would be so foolish as to sue NBA for discrimination against small
people.
As
for equality of opportunity, it is rather vaguely defined in the text. What
precisely is a social position? Perhaps being a mother is a social position, too
(it certainly carries its social status), but 1 wonder how anyone is going to do
anything about the fact that the male half of humankind is denied 46equal access"
to this social position. Or being a respected member of a community may be a
social position: but could anyone guarantee equal access to respectability?
Enjoying one's fellows' respect is something totally unenforceable.
But
perhaps the phrase "social role" is supposed to denote formal
positions: appointments, elective offices and so on. But in such context, couldn't
"provision of equal access to institutions and social positions among
relevant social groups" just as well go under the heading of formal
equality under the law?
The arguments presented here are obviously brief. Moreover, they concentrate on the aspect of implementation of the different kinds of equality, i.e. on the practical aspects. My conclusion is that, except for formal equality, the debated concepts are all utopian and experiments based on them doomed to fail (which they all have in the past). 1 suppose other arguments could be constructed, pertaining to the desirability of these different strands of equality. But that is a task for some other homework.